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Summary 
A Red List of Deforestation was published by Brazil’s federal government in 2008, 
listing 36 municipalities with the highest rates of deforestation in the Amazon as a policy 
measure to prioritize efforts to combat deforestation. Here, we examine the reaction of a 
municipality to the decentralization policy represented by the Red List. We analyze the 
case of Paragominas, a municipality in the state of Pará, in the eastern Brazilian Amazon. 
Since being removed from the Red List in April 2010 Paragominas has swapped infamy 
for fame, and has become widely renowned in Brazilian policy discourse and the public 
media as a successful example of controlling deforestation. In this study, we analyze the 
development of the Green Municipality or Município Verde (MV) project, a novel 
governance arrangement that brought together municipal, state, and federal government 
as well as local farmers Unions and Associations, and regionally active non-
governmental organizations. We identify key actors and institutions involved in the 
process, and try to better understand the preexisting conditions that set the groundwork 
for the MV initiative. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of this policy in controlling 
deforestation and achieving environmental compliance within different social groups. 
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1 Introduction 
Annual rates of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon declined by 77.5% between 2004-
2011 (INPE/Prodes, 2012). Yet, the future of the Amazon forest is still uncertain and 
there remains an urgent need for environmental policies to be improved and strengthened 
in order to achieve conservation goals and sustainable development in the region 
(Nepstad et al, 2011a). Many factors affect deforestation dynamics, the main proximate 
driver being agriculture activity, and underlying causes including population growth and 
consumption patterns, international exchange rates, access to road and transport 
networks, and land tenure (DeFries et at, 2010; Fearnside, 2001; Garcia et al, 2006; Geist 
& Lambin, 2002; Nepstad et al, 1999, 2006; Soares-Filho et al, 2004). The relationship 
between many of these factors and rates of deforestation is mediated by policies and 
institutions. Thus far command and control policies have been more successful than 
incentives for sustainable land use (CEPAL et al, 2011). New hybrid and multi-level 
governance arrangements are emerging as part of ongoing efforts to promote compliance 
with environmental and social laws. 
Brazil is organized as a federative system, divided into 26 states plus the Federal District, 
and then subdivided into municipalities. Environmental licensing and monitoring has 
traditionally been the purview of central government, but these responsibilities are 
gradually being delegated to states6. In turn, states may opt to reorganize activities and 
responsibilities at the municipal level, which in the Amazon can constitute enormous 
areas (for example the municipality of Altamira in Pará which spans some 160,000 km2 
or 65% of the territory of the United Kingdom). Under current legislation, municipalities 
have elected governments and some fiscal and financial flexibility to capture and 
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administer resources. It also has obligations, especially in the health and education 
sectors (Scardua and Bursztyn, 2003). 
Decentralization of environmental policies can be positive if it delivers more power to the 
hands of municipal actors, allowing for more flexibility and innovation in terms of 
partnerships in different social arenas, and constitution of social arrangements compatible 
with local needs. A significant number of case studies in different parts of the world 
demonstrate the effectiveness of participatory forest management (Sandbrook et al, 
2010). Mexico offers an example of community forest management that was able to 
conserve biodiversity, forest productivity and forest cover over time (Bray et al, 2003).  
Alternatively, decentralization can have negative environmental impacts if local 
governments lack the capacity for good governance, and traditional local powers have too 
much influence on what are often politically weak environmental departments, 
influencing enforcement of environmental legislation (Ribot, 2004). This was observed in 
Cameroon, with central government not willing to lose control over forest resources 
management by not fully transferring governance power to local actors. Moreover, local 
elites became interested in governing forests through management committees, hijacking 
communities (Oyono, 2004). This poses a question whether increasing the value of 
forests through the mechanism of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) can revert decentralization trends and promote a recentralization 
of forest governance (Phelps et al, 2010).  
New institutional arrangements are emerging to govern natural resources, with state, 
market and society acting in partnership. These hybrid or soft forms of governance can be 
shared by state, markets and communities, involving one or more parties, each addressing 
others’ weaknesses and building upon others’ strengths (Lemos and Agrawal, 2009). In 
the Brazilian Amazon, hybrid governance mechanisms may provide the conditions for 
novel conservation opportunities, as evidenced by the increasing role of the market in 
fostering environmental compliance and the adoption of good management practices 
(Nepstad et at, 2006, 2011). On the other hand, the reconfiguration of environmental 
governance is often focused on a restricted number of sectors, which may create 
governance gaps. It may also strengthen the power of single actors such as markets, thus 
perpetuating and even increasing social inequality in decision-making (Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2009). 
In this study, we examine changes to environmental governance systems in the Brazilian 
Amazon by focusing on the municipality of Paragominas in the state of Pará, Eastern 
Amazon. During the last years Paragominas has developed a novel multi-partner 
governance arrangement at the municipal level, involving state, society, and market 
actors. The municipality went from being the main timber-producing region in the 
country in the late 1980’s and a case of remarkable deforestation to becoming a national 
reference in municipal-level anti-deforestation policy. Faced with strengthened 
command-and-control policies from central government, landowners and political leaders 
of Paragominas built a pact for zero deforestation and improved environmental 
compliance.  
This paper is structured in five parts, that 1) present Paragominas as our case study, 2) 
give an overview of recent environmental policies in the Brazilian Amazon, and the 
build-up of the Brazilian federal government’s Red List of most deforesting 
municipalities; 3) consider the way in which the market has played an important role in 
developing the conditions that motivated compliance among rural producers; 4) describe 
the methods and framework used for this study, before 5) present our results, which 
describe i) the process of building the Green Municipality or Município Verde (MV), 
identifying key actors and institutions ii) the conditions that enabled the process, and iii) 
the effectiveness of the project by addressing the shortcomings of the process so far, risks 
and the work remaining.  
2 Context 
2.1 Paragominas 
Paragominas is a municipality located 217 km south from Pará’s capital Belém. The 
original land cover is humid tropical forest, but in 2010 Paragominas had only 51.56% of 
its 1,945,200 hectares covered by forests (INPE/Prodes, 2012). Moreover, work by 
Nepstad et al (1999) showed that only one tenth of the area classified as forests by 
official classifications (forest/non-forest) correspond to undisturbed forests, the rest 
having been previously logged and/or burned.  
The region was initially home to three indigenous groups, the Tembé, Amanayé and 
Ka’apor. The occupation by non-Indians started with extrativist populations along the 
Gurupi, Capim and Uraim rivers in the late 1940’s. In 1960 the federal highway BR 010 
was inaugurated, connecting the recently built capital Brasília to Belém. The town of 
Paragominas was founded in 1965 along the Belém-Brasília highway (Figure 1), with the 
federal government enabling access to land and credit, specifically for cattle ranching, 
which in turn attracted investors from the southern states of Brazil. The road also allowed 
for other waves of migration, as workers from the northeastern states of the country and 
other regions of Pará state (Barros, 2003).  
[Figure 1] 
Figure 1. Location map of Paragominas. 
The agricultural practices used in the cattle pastures, often inadequately adapted from 
other regions, soon exhausted the fragile Amazonian soils of Paragominas, which are 
mainly comprised of oxisols and ultisols (Veríssimo et al, 2002). In face of the national 
credit crisis facing cattle ranching and the decline of timber production in other parts of 
the country, timber extraction rapidly became a very profitable activity. In 1989-1990, 
Paragominas was the main timber-producing region in Brazil, with a total of 238 
sawmills (Veríssimo et al, 2002).  
In the late 1990s, timber became scarce, many people were left without work, and the 
municipality was infamous for urban and rural violence. Hoping to launch a new 
economic cycle, a small group of farmers invested in an experimental soy field in a 
private farm. In 1995, a partnership between the municipal and state governments, and 
agricultural research and extensionist institutions (e.g. Embrapa – Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation) inaugurated Paragominas as a grain center. Employing new 
machinery and agriculture technology, Paragominas quickly achieved high yields in soy, 
corn, rice and cotton, attracting investment and companies (Barros, 2003; Paragominas, 
2012). 
Currently, 78.2% of the 97,819 residents in Paragominas are urban (IBGE, 2010). 
Paragominas’s economy is responsible for 2.3% of Pará’s GDP and relies on agriculture 
and cattle ranching (14.6%), industry (32,4%), and services (54.0%) (IBGE, 2009). 
According to IBGE (2006), private rural properties in Paragominas make up 31.3% of 
Paragominas, of which 46.7% are >500ha and 40.1% are <100ha (IBGE, 2006).  
2.2 Environmental policies in the Amazon and the build-up to the Red List 
After a history of promoting deforestation as a means for occupation and development of 
the Amazon, in recent years the federal government has undertaken a markedly different 
path. In 2004, the federal government launched the Action Plan for Prevention and 
Control of Deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (PPCDAm). It consisted of a set 
of policies structured around three objectives: (i) regulating land tenure and zoning land 
use, (ii) monitoring land conversion, and (iii) incentives for sustainable activities. There 
is some evidence that PPCDAm has been at least partially successful, especially in the 
application of command and control policies (CEPAL et al, 2011). Thus, PPCDAm has 
been attributed a significant positive role in contributing towards recent declining trend in 
deforestation rates (Figure 2) (Barreto and Araújo, 2012). 
[Figure 2] 
Figure 2. Deforestation rate in the Brazilian Amazon. Source: INPE/Prodes, 2012.  
A sudden increase in Amazonian deforestation in 2007-2008 (Figure 2) triggered the 
federal government to react with a series of policy measures. In December 2007 and 
January 2008, the federal government issued new legislation (Presidential Decree 
6321/2007 and Portaria MMA 28/2008) that focused the fight against deforestation to 
selected municipalities in the Brazilian Amazon (Guimaraes et al, 2011). A Red List was 
published based on three criteria that evaluate the historic dynamic of deforestation at the 
municipal level: (a) total area deforested, (b) total area deforested in the previous 3 years, 
and (c) an increase in deforestation rates in at least 3 of the previous 5 years. Thirty-six 
municipalities entered the list and became a priority for policies for preventing and 
monitoring illegal deforestation. Despite representing only 6% of all municipalities in the 
Amazon biome, the 36 municipalities accounted for >50% of the deforested area in 2007, 
and all were located in the “arc of deforestation”7 (Alencar et al, 2004).  
The Presidential Decree also established the conditions for exiting the list: municipalities 
must (a) have at least 80% of their territory on private lands georreferenced and land 
tenure re-registered, and (b) maintain their annual deforestation rate and area below a 
limit established by the Environment Ministry. Moreover, the Decree made anyone who 
buys, transports or sells products from properties under embargo for violating 
environmental laws co-responsible for the original crime. An amendment issued in March 
2009 (Portaria MMA 103/2009) modified the criteria for exiting the list, which became 
the following: (a) have at least 80% of the territory on private lands monitored through 
rural environmental registration (Cadastro Ambiental Rural – CAR), by georreferencing 
of properties’ boundaries, areas under permanent protection and legal reserves8; (b) 2008 
deforestation be ≤40km2, and (c) annual deforestation mean of the years 2007 and 2008 
≤60% of the mean observed in the 2004-2006 period.  
This legal apparatus made possible a strong set of actions that fell under the name “Arco 
de Fogo” (Arc of Fire)9. This operation was launched in collaboration between state 
government, Federal Police, the Brazilian Institute for Environment and Natural 
Resources (IBAMA), and the National Army, targeting municipalities in the Red List. 
Actions were aimed at controlling activities linked to illegal deforestation previously 
observed through satellite monitoring.  
                                                
7 The “arc of deforestation” is constituted by 249 municipalities, representing an area of about 170 million 
ha. 
8 Legal reserves are a parcel of private land spared for conservation purposes, which varies in the Legal 
Amazon from 35% (in ecotonal areas of savannah) 50% (in consolidated areas under state-level 
environmental zoning) to 80% of the property (in forested areas). Areas under permanent protection are 
areas that must be covered with natural vegetation such as riparian forests and areas with steep slope 
(Forest Code, 1965). 
9 Arc of Fire refers to the fire used to deforest, but also conveys an idea of strength put into the control. 
As a reaction to the command and control operations the government also implemented 
the “Arco Verde” (Green Arc) Operation, with the objectives of legalizing land tenure 
and creating positive incentives to promote sustainable activities. Actions and activities 
were defined case-by-case in each municipality, with a common focus on helping rural 
landowners clarify and legalize land tenure. Nevertheless, “Arco Verde” was not as 
successful as “Arco de Fogo” in the more immediate term, in part because it was 
inherently more complex and demanded the continuous presence of the state (CEPAL et 
al, 2011). Also in 2008, the federal government launched the Sustainable Amazon Plan, 
which proposed an integrated set of strategies and recommendations for the sustainable 
development of the Brazilian Amazon, and with investment from the Norwegian 
development agency, created the Amazon Fund, a fund with the aim of financing actions 
against deforestation and promoting the sustainable uses of forests.  
The combination of the PPCDAm, the establishment of the Amazon Fund, and support 
from the Environment Ministry created the basis for state governments to elaborate state-
level plans for prevention and control of deforestation (Brasil/MMA, 2011). In 2009, the 
state of Pará approved its Plan for Prevention, Control and Alternatives to Deforestation, 
in which it established targets for decreasing deforestation and commitment to 
implementing activities following the structure of PPCDAm and overarching framework 
of PAS.  
2.3 Market forces 
Non-state market-driven governance systems can have impacts on social and 
environmental standards, forcing producers to comply with certain criteria (Cashore, 
2002). Among other strategies, market pressures can lead to a boycott of certain products, 
demand that “good practices” be adopted, and the creation of certification schemes for 
ensuring that standards are met (Brannstrom et al. 2012). Could these non-market 
pressures explain the drop in deforestation in Paragominas?  
There is little evidence to suggest the establishment of the Amazon soy moratorium in 
2006 (Greenpeace, 2006) altered deforestation practices in Paragominas. Although major 
soy export associations signed the moratorium, the land-cover of soy in Paragominas 
(10,000ha in 2006; IBGE, 2007) is very limited compared to pasture for cattle (210,983ha 
in the same year, support nearly 455,000 cattle according to IBGE, 2008). However, even 
if a direct effect cannot be recognized in Paragominas, it is very likely that the soy 
moratorium increased awareness among farmers about the market force and its 
consequences  
Non-state market forces may have affected the cattle industry, which is held to be 
responsible for the majority of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (Margulis, 2003; 
Alencar, 2004). Pará has the second largest cattle herd in the Legal Amazon after the 
state of Mato Grosso. In 2009, the Public Attorney of Pará state (MPF) together with the 
Brazilian Institute for the Environment (IBAMA) adopted a new strategy for promoting 
environmental compliance in cattle producing farms. By investigating the supply chain of 
the meat industry, a number of farms and slaughterhouses were sued for not following the 
environmental legislation. Supermarkets and industry were oriented not to buy meat from 
the sued slaughterhouses, under the risk of being sanctioned. As a result, the association 
of Brazilian supermarkets started demanding a certification of origin for Amazon-origin 
meat products (Barreto & Araújo, 2012). 
2.4 Paragominas in the Red List 
In January 2008, Paragominas joined the Red List of most deforesting municipalities, and 
in April 2008, the “Arco de Fogo” Operation arrived in Paragominas. From a central 
office based in the town, the joint forces targeted the extraction and commercialization of 
illegally logged timber, irregular sawmills and coal production sites. The most dramatic 
impact was through the shutting down of illegal sawmills, which had a direct effect on 
the urban economy and jobs.  
The inclusion of Paragominas on the Red List of deforestation triggered initiatives for 
promoting more sustainable land-use practices that were already under discussion 
amongst political leaders in municipality. With the shared goal of exiting the Red List, 
the municipal government in Paragominas initiated a series of meetings with rural 
landowners, as well as developing partnerships with Instituto do Homem e Meio 
Ambiente da Amazônia (Imazon, a national NGO working in Paragominas since the 
1990’s) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC, an international NGO), resulting in a pact 
for zero deforestation and definition of an action plan.  
Collectively, the group developed rules to regulate management practices that were then 
institutionalized through the MV initiative. The main objective of the rules was to meet 
the criteria for exiting the Red List, which had essentially two components: decreasing 
deforestation, and georreferencing properties under the CAR. In order to address both 
components, the MV was constituted of three main strategies: (i) a pact for zero 
deforestation, (ii) monitoring deforestation, and (iii) CAR of properties. Additional goals 
were set for optimizing production within sustainable landscapes, marked by compliance 
with environmental legislation and increased productivity. These aspects were voluntary, 
and more aspirational to improve image of the municipality and respond to market 
demand. 
3 Methods and framework 
This study was conducted within as part of the Sustainable Amazon Network (Rede 
Amazônia Sustentável, RAS, in Portuguese), a multi-institutional research project 
evaluating the social-ecological sustainability of different land uses and agricultural 
management in the eastern Brazilian Amazon. As part of this wider project, we 
conducted 235 structured interviews in 2011 with landowners throughout the 
municipality of Paragominas, ranging from agrarian reform settlements to cattle ranching 
and mechanized farming. These interviews allowed a close communication with 
individual landowners for understanding their perspectives on conservation initiatives 
like MV. The 5 months spent in Paragominas provided rich background information 
about the MV program through informal conversations with landowners, political leaders, 
NGO representatives and others, as well as by frequently reading local newspaper and 
listening to radio programs.  
Contacts with stakeholder in Paragominas started in 2008, with frequent visits to data 
collection sites in private lands, as well as various meetings and interactions with 
different groups of farmers. These initial contacts coincided with the emergence of the 
MV, which allowed the observation of important aspects of the process.  
At the beginning of RAS the research coordinating team organized meetings with key 
stakeholders involved in the rural development of the municipality, including the MV 
initiative. Meetings were organized with the mayor of Paragominas, the Union of Rural 
Producers (SPRP), Union of Rural Workers (STTR) and other key leaderships in the 
municipality. RAS also works in close relationship with the two non-governmental 
organizations involved in the implementation of MV (TNC and Imazon), which allowed 
an integration and consultation about the initiative since its early stages. 
We also continue in close relation to the field since the end of formal data collection 
period through additional research studies focused on agrarian reform settlements.  
In addition, we collected extra data on the MV initiative through open-ended interviews 
with researchers, representatives of the federal government, representatives of NGOs, and 
local stakeholders and farmers in Paragominas. We also attended a large number of 
meetings and events in Paragominas and Belém related to the development and 
implementation of the MV. The analysis presented in this study was enriched by relevant 
secondary data about the institutions and processes of building the MV. 
To aid analysis we employ the theoretical framework proposed by collective action 
theory. Classical theory for solving social dilemma argues that individuals seek to 
maximize individual benefits, leading to a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). 
However, several cases of natural resources management demonstrate that under certain 
circumstances, collective action prevails over individual benefits (Poteete & Ostrom, 
2008, Ostrom, 1990). Communication and sanction capacity are important factors for 
cooperation (Janssen et al, 2010), as well as monitoring and enforcement of rules (Gibson 
et al, 2005; Ostrom, 2009). Other micro-situational variables known to play important 
role in creating the environment for collective action are marginal rate of return, 
reputation, long time horizon, capacity to enter and exit the group, assurance that all will 
contribute, group size, availability of information, heterogeneity of participants (Ostrom, 
2005), dependence of user on resource, type of benefit sharing, trust and reciprocity, 
autonomy of the group, and previous organization experience (Jansen & Ostrom, 2001). 
Leadership also increases the likelihood of self-organization (Ostrom, 2009). 
4 Results 
4.1 Building the process 
The MV initiated with meetings for defining the objectives and goals of the pact. 
Meetings were called and led by the municipal government (under the leadership of the 
mayor), and were attended by representatives of different rural Unions and Associations, 
which responded for the majority of rural producers, as well as NGOs. Once the basis of 
the pact was established, public meetings were used to communicate the strategy. 
Dissemination and mobilization was achieved through announcements in the media 
(banners, radio, newspapers, etc), as well as by representatives of the Unions and 
Associations with the farmers they represented. Representatives of federal and state 
government were also present in meetings in order to clarify the conflict and negotiate 
possible solutions.  
The basic rules contained in the pact were the commitment to reducing deforestation and 
registration of rural properties under the CAR. Negotiation with farmers that had 
previous authorization to deforest was done in a case-by-case basis, led by the mayor. In 
case where the rules were violated (identified by satellite information or denunciation), 
the municipal government investigated the violation and tried to solve it locally by 
gathering a group of landowners and talking to the violators. In cases where informal 
solutions were unsuccessful, they either sought support from the state government, or 
found legal means for solving the conflict. 
Several partnerships were established, assuming different roles in the project. In addition 
to the mayor's office three of institutions were central to implementing the project. 
Imazon led capacity building workshops with agents of the municipal government in 
order to allow them to interpret and use the monthly reports of deforestation in 
Paragominas sent by Imazon to the mayor’s office, allowing for sanctioning of occasional 
violations of the pact. The SPRP was responsible for mobilizing and informing medium 
and large-scale (>c.200 ha) landowners of the project, as well as to encourage them to 
register their properties under CAR. The Union headquarters became the focal point for 
information and meetings. TNC was responsible for organizing the CAR with SPRP, and 
at subsidized cost for the farmers. Instead of costing as much as R$ 5000, the CAR cost 
about R$ 250 for each farmer in 2010 (Guimaraes et al, 2011).  
It is important to note that while the Union of Rural Producers was an active part of the 
MV, the Union of Rural Workers participated of the initial meetings, but was marginal to 
the process. Moreover, in order to achieve the 80% of the territory registered, in the first 
moment small properties were not included in the CAR process. 
There were several reasons why landowners were attracted to participating in the MV. 
First, participating in the project provided legal security to the landowner, by coming into 
compliance with environmental legislation and clarifying land tenure. Another key reason 
was the perception of providing preferential access to national and international 
commodity markets, such as the meat industry. Finally, the federal government gave 
priority to municipalities that exit the Red List for access to credit and federal programs 
and projects that aim to incentivize sustainable activities such as forest plantations, 
agroforestry, and sustainable agriculture and cattle ranching (Portaria MMA 67/2010; 
Guimaraes et al, 2011). 
4.2 Conditions that enabled the process 
Geographic location, infamy and attraction of scientists and NGOs. The fact that 
Paragominas once was the main timber-producing centre in Brazil, coupled with its 
proximity to the Belém-Brasília highway led scientists, NGOs, and private companies to 
analyze from an early stage the impacts of business-as-usual timber extraction and 
propose alternative models such as sustainable management (Nepstad et al, 1991; Uhl 
and Vieira, 1989; Uhl et al, 1997; Veríssimo et al, 2002). The presence of scientists 
working in farms in Paragominas in the late 1980s brought national and international 
attention to the region and provided landowners with leadership in the region with an 
early awareness and interest in the potential for alternative management practices. Indeed 
this pioneering research led to the creation of Imazon in 1990, and it has been extremely 
active in the region since then. Also in 1992, the international NGO Tropical Forest 
Foundation (TFF) launched a demonstration project of reduced-impact (RIL) forest 
management in Paragominas, which has since become the textbook example of RIL for 
the entire Amazon. The Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazonia (IPAM), an active 
national NGO, also grew from a base in Paragominas, in 1995. 
Political leadership and Vale. The process was also assisted through continual 
entrepreneurial leadership in Paragominas. In 1996, Sydney Rosa was elected mayor of 
Paragominas. He came from the timber industry and had an interest in maintaining the 
timber sector and creating incentives for reforestation. He invested in the town and 
brought Vale (one of Brazil's largest companies and one of the biggest mining enterprises 
in the world) to Paragominas, which later would result an important source of finance to 
support new policies and infrastructure such as roads, buildings, and schools. Vale’s 
activities in Paragominas initiated with the exploitation of bauxite, and more recently 
Vale became an important investor in the expanding plantation forestry to supply iron 
smelting factories in other parts of the country. In 2009 was established the Vale Fund for 
Sustainable Development, a third-sector organization that invests in sustainable 
development projects in the Amazon. The Fund has been an important supporter of the 
MV initiative, providing funds for TNC, Imazon, and the SPRP.  
Agency and entrepreneurship. Sydney was re-elected, and his then deputy, Adnan 
Demachki, was elected in 2004, and re-elected in 2008. This political continuity and the 
adoption of policies that attracted significant investment to the town transformed 
Paragominas in less than a decade from being a place notorious for violence to the new 
centre of rural growth in Pará. In addition to Vale the second major source of investment 
was from the mechanized agricultural sector with Paragominas quickly establishing itself 
as the largest producer of grains in the state of Pará, and more recently in the form of a 
chipboard factory to be supplied by a rapid growth in planted forests. At the same time as 
the establishment of the Rosa-Demachki political power-base, a strong leadership arose 
in the presidency of SPRP, and included in its directorate individuals with significant 
previous involvement with scientific research and NGOs, and had already started to 
develop differentiated land management practices in their own properties.  
Exhausted forest resources. An additional, critically important factor that contributed to 
the emergence of the new governance arrangement in Paragominas was the fact that its 
previously lucrative forest resources had been severely exploited. This meant that there 
was little merchantable timber left to be harvested, and a large proportion of grain and 
cattle farmers in Paragominas were once leading loggers. This well-established and 
wealthy elite had interest in increasing valuation of their rural properties. 
In summary, Paragominas had a unique collection of factors that contributed towards 
developing the enabling conditions for MV. Figure 3 presents a flowchart describing the 
previous conditions and context that led to the implementation of the MV project, the key 
elements in the process building of the MV, and the results achieved by this political 
process. 
[Figure 3] 
Figure 3. Key elements in conceiving and developing the MV, and the main results 
achieved by the project 
4.3 Effectiveness of Município Verde in Paragominas  
Deforestation  
The MV achieved a key component of its stated goal by diminishing deforestation to 21 
km2 in 2009 (Brito et al, 2012) and registering nearly 690 properties, or 94% of the 
territory outside of reserves under CAR. In April 2010 Paragominas exited the Red List.  
According to INPE data, the rate of deforestation in Paragominas has slowed but has not 
halted (Figure 4). Imazon’s Risk of Deforestation report indicated Paragominas’ region 
still as an area with high risk of deforestation based on projected rates from historic 
spatial patterns and other variables such as distance from roads and rivers, topography, 
distance from protected areas and economic reach (Sales et al, 2012). 
[Figure 4] 
Figure 4. Deforestation rate in the municipality of Paragominas. Source: INPE/Prodes, 
2012. 
A study conducted in Mato Grosso state concluded that georreferencing properties’ 
boundaries did not result in deforestation control as expected. Instead, it became an act of 
“institutional subversion”, in which the initial goals were contradicted by the outcomes of 
the policy: properties georreferenced even increased deforestation, by gaining official 
permits to deforest and favored by poor monitoring and law enforcement (Rajão et al, 
2012). Considering this, it is probably still too early to draw conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the MV on long-term maintenance of forest cover.  
Leakage can be an unintended consequence of focusing the combat against deforestation 
at the municipal level. An example occurred after command-and control actions in 
Tailândia, a municipality in Paragominas’ region, which resulted in leakage of illegal 
logging to the neighboring municipality of Moju. Tailândia was inserted to the Red List 
in March 2009, and Moju entered in May 2011.  
The MV focused on stopping deforestation and did not address forest degradation as it 
was not part of the Red List policy. However, forest degradation is a relevant issue in 
Paragominas and elsewhere in the Amazon (Asner et al, 2005) and point to the need of a 
systemic approach to conservation in order to secure the maintenance of environmental 
services (Nepstad et al, 1991, 1999, 2011; Veríssimo et al, 2002).  
Social inclusion  
The area where the MV has achieved the least progress is in securing the effective 
participation of the smallholder farmers in the municipality, who together make up the 
vast majority of the rural population in Paragominas. Smallholders in the region generally 
have little access to credit from banks, and/or may be burdened by high debts from earlier 
government incentivized extension projects. As such the impacts of the Red List were not 
felt as strongly as was the case for medium and large landowners.  
The Worker’s Union represents around 5,000 small farmers, who were seen to be in great 
disadvantage with the establishment of the MV. As shown by our interviews, many of the 
small farmers were unable or not willing to abandon their traditional practice of slash and 
burn agriculture. Little alternative was given for stopping illegal deforestation and 
charcoal production, which would require capacity building and investments in new 
technologies and alternative activities. Previous experiences for introducing alternative 
production activities among smallholders have failed, result of lack of technical 
assistance, low quality inputs, and/or bad transport infrastructure. Many of the small 
farmers therefore saw little benefits from committing to zero deforestation. 
However, small farms are an important piece for achieving the goals of a green 
municipality. While loggers may have increased the flammability of forests (Barlow et al. 
2012), smallholders are often responsible for a large number of ignition sources through 
their use of maintenance fires in the region. These smallholders need to be included in the 
political process to ensure viable alternatives to slash and burn, or better fire management 
practices that minimize the risk of forest fires (Barlow et al. 2012).  
Indigenous territories are not governed by the municipal government, and there is some 
evidence to show that the Rio Guamá reserve is the origin of a large share of illegally 
logged timber in the municipality. These flaws demonstrate the importance of a more 
integrated strategy towards sustainability across the municipality. 
Several challenges remain for Paragominas becoming a green municipality. On the one 
hand, degradation and fire must be addressed, as well as the long-term observation of 
deforestation patterns across Paragominas’ region. On the other, the program must also 
address social minorities, such as small farmers. 
5 Discussion 
The results presented here identified key aspects of the development of the MV initiative, 
signaling actors, institutions and enabling preconditions present in Paragominas. Our 
analysis conclude that the MV was successful in achieving its goal to exit the Red List, 
though failed to involve smallholders and achieve zero deforestation. In light of our 
results, we discuss whether the Red List was a decentralization policy and identify 
lessons learned from the Paragominas case, and discuss the potential for extrapolation of 
its experience to other municipalities.  
Decentralization of environmental regulation 
The national-level policies of decentralizing efforts to combat and control deforestation 
in the Amazon through the Red List had varying results in different municipalities. Until 
April 2012, only two of the fifty municipalities that entered the List had exited: 
Paragominas, and the Mato Grosso State’s municipality of Querência.  
The small number of successful cases, exemplified here by Paragominas, indicates that 
specific conditions are central to solving the conflict caused by past deforestation and the 
arrival of the Red List, rather than the policy of decentralization being a widespread 
success. Indeed, it is useful to question if the Red List was a decentralization policy. 
Decentralization is often defined as the transfer of power from a central government to 
actors or institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative or territorial hierarchy 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). In the case of the Red List, there was no strengthening of 
municipal-level power, rather there was a shift in the delegation of responsibilities and 
the re-direction and expansion of punishments for illegal activities from a focus on 
individual farmers to the entire municipality. 
In Brazil, the process of decentralization started with the 1988 Constitution, after a period 
of strong centralized government during military rule. The new Constitution opened the 
way towards shared responsibility for natural resource management across different 
levels of government. This shared responsibility created gaps and overlaps of power, but 
also made room for collaboration (Toni, 2006).  
Until PPCDAm and the Red List initiative, few responsibilities for combating 
deforestation were assigned to states and municipalities in the Amazon. Only more 
recently have such responsibilities been explicitly transferred to state governments. That 
said, the goal of the Red List was not to transfer responsibility to the municipal level, but 
to straighten collaboration between government levels. The “Arco de Fogo” and “Arco 
Verde” operations were led by the federal government, and focused on delivering results 
at the municipal and property level.  
Despite the initial goal of conditioning the exit from the Red List to land ownership 
regularization of properties, the difficulty of the federal government in conducting land 
tenure regularization caused the requirement to change. Instead, the CAR grants an 
identity to the property and attends monitoring purposes, but it does not denote land 
ownership. Every property with forestry, agriculture or cattle ranching activities should 
also have the Licenciamento Ambiental Único (LAR), which secures that productive 
activities are made without causing environmental damages. Despite its importance, 
Paragominas was yet not able to transition from CAR to LAR or Certificado de Cadastro 
do Imóvel Rural (CCIR, which gives definite land ownership). 
Reasons for perceived success 
Municipalities vary in their motivation to mobilize their actors and exit the Red List. One 
of the motivations for Paragominas to provide leadership in reverting the negative image 
bestowed by being on the Red List was to attract new investment to the town through a 
wide adoption of “good practices” in agriculture and cattle ranching. Legal Lucas, one of 
the inspirations for Paragominas’ leaders, was triggered to implement “best practices” by 
market demand and sanctions from the soy industry (Brannstrom, 2012). In the case of 
Paragominas, we believe that the restrictions imposed on the meat supply chain, and to 
some extent the perceived effect of the soy moratorium elsewhere, played important roles 
in developing MV. This market-driven component of the process doubtless contributed 
towards the lack of participation of smallholder farmers as the perceived benefits of their 
collaboration did not exceed the costs from complying with the rules, which in this case 
would have meant sacrificing traditional agricultural practices. 
The experience of Paragominas matches the Environmental Kuznets Curve, which 
predicts that environmental degradation has an inverted U-shaped curve relationship with 
economic development. Despite several critiques of this model (Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz, 1999; Stern, 2004), studies based on international datasets indicate that the 
theory can apply to deforestation (Battharai & Hamming, 2001), though applying the 
hypothesis to the case of Paragominas require further research. Part of the argument 
behind a Kuznet's curve is the rise of an environmentally conscious sector of society (due 
to negative feedbacks from degradation), and while this is evident to some degree in 
Paragominas, the legal and market demand sides seem to be much stronger.  
The political and socio-economic conditions in Paragominas during the 1990s 
predisposed municipal actors towards developing and embracing a project such as the 
MV. In particular, our interview work indicated that the most important enabling factor 
may have been the agency and entrepreneurship of political leaders, who saw the 
situation as an opportunity for renewed growth and investment, and who held sufficient 
political capital to secure a critical mass of support. Moreover, it is likely that farmers 
agreed with the MV because Paragominas is part of an old frontier, and many of the 
property owners have an interest in staying there and investing in improving the city as 
well as their own production.  
Extrapolation  
In 2011 the state government of Pará launched the program Green Municipalities 
(Municípios Verdes), as an attempt to expand Paragominas’ achievements to other 
municipalities throughout the state. The program is voluntary, and seeks to empower 
municipalities to improve the regulation and management of their natural resources 
through multi-sector partnerships and funding from the state and Fundo Vale. However, 
they are facing a series of institutional difficulties in operationalising the program. An 
important challenge is to overcome the lack of institutions and social capital capable of 
implementing and maintaining the often highly technical work of monitoring 
deforestation, registering properties, and giving technical assistance to farmers. Both 
TNC and Imazon have supported the presence of permanent, skilled staff members, and 
office facilities in Paragominas throughout the majority of the lifetime of the project. 
These NGOs filled the gap in technical capacity that is often highlighted as an 
explanation for the failure of decentralization policies (Fox and Aranda, 1996). All these 
essential conditions are more difficult to be met in the agricultural frontier, in the most 
remote areas of the Amazon.  
The establishment of new and multi-sector partnerships was key for the development of 
MV. Nevertheless, these same partnerships may also represent a weakness of the MV, 
given that voluntary partnerships can be vulnerable to political transitions and financing. 
Relying on such multi-sector partnerships may not be viable at the state level, because of 
the much greater scale of the challenge and the limited capacity of NGOs and other 
technical institutions to recruit and fund sufficient trained employees.  
In a similar sense the strong leaderships in government, Farmer’s Union, NGOs, and 
Public Attorney, so crucial to the development of MV, could also been seen as an 
inherent vulnerability as its maintenance is dependent on political context and the 
presence, interest and availability of particular individuals. Based on these arguments, it 
is unclear whether the MV can be replicated to other municipalities.  
Currently, the MV is entering its second phase by promoting sustainable land uses at the 
property level, through efforts to achieve full compliance of rural properties with 
environmental legislation and municipality level ecological-economic zoning. As part of 
this phase, the mayor's office in Paragominas together with leading partners have 
established partnerships with Fundo Vale, University of São Paulo, State University of 
São Paulo, the private company Dow Agrosciences. RAS will give scientific support to 
the initiative through research on land-use sustainability in the region. In order to ensure 
that this hybrid governance and support system does not result in “short-term fixes and 
long-term ineffectiveness” (Lemos and Agrawal, 2009), the MV must continue investing 
in knowledge sharing and diminishing power inequalities, in particular with regard to 
smallholder farmers. 
6 Conclusions 
Our analysis of the case of Paragominas demonstrates that hybrid governance 
arrangements can provide partially successful solutions for conflict situations involving 
private decisions regarding land-use. We also argue that the Brazilian Federal 
government's Red List of Deforestation was not a decentralization policy, but rather an 
attempt to share responsibilities between government levels and improve cooperation 
between them. The effectiveness of this response at the municipal level depends on 
several factors, with key elements being strong leaderships and reliable multi-sector 
partnerships to cover the predictable lack of technical capacity and social capital. We also 
suggest that these same elements are inherently vulnerable given their sensitivity to 
political and historical context and the dependency on key individuals.  
Comparative analysis of the process that led Querência out of the Red List would enrich 
our understanding of the municipal capacity for political mobilization. Looking at other 
success cases can possibly indicate best ways to institutionalize the attribution of greater 
political capacity to municipalities There is also a need to look more deeply at failures to 
try to understand why other municipalities are still on the Red List and why/how have 
their efforts been inadequate.  
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Pre-existing conditions Market forces 
Federal Government command-and-
control policies 
•  Decrease in deforestation rates  
•  94% of potential territory with rural environmental 
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Solution-based initiatives 
 
•  Meetings between municipal and state government representatives, farmer's union, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector  
 
- Availability of information 
- Clear definition of goals  
- Participation of representatives from federal government for clarification and credibility 
- Strong media attention to improve transparency and trust in the process amongst the population 
of Paragominas 
- Collective development of rules to guide the MV program    
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•  Municipal plan: Município Verde underpinned by three main strategies: pact for zero 
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•  Key institutions 
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